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Explaining decision-making structures in Swiss politics:
A combination of SNA and QCA1

Manuel Fischer
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (USA) / University of Geneva (CH)
Manuel.Fischer@unige.ch

Abstract
This paper attempts to explain decision-making structures in Swiss politics. Decision-making
structures describe the relations between collective actors collaborating and fighting for
influence in a policy network and are defined by two main dimensions, which are power and
conflict. For the explanation of decision-making structures, the paper relies on factors such as
Europeanization, media presence, federalism, the pre-parliamentary phase and the
referendum. I assume that these different factors interact with each other when they influence
the decision-making structure. In order to assess the importance of these factors, the paper
compares the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and
2006. The analysis relies on an innovative integration of two methods. In a first step, I apply
Social Network Analysis to describe the two dimensions of decision-making structures. In a
second step, in order to detect the different combinations of causes which lead to different
structures, the 11 cases are compared by a Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA). The
results suggest that all five factors are important to understand decision-making structures and
that equifinality and conjunctural causation are at work.

1

Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the ASNA (Applications of Social Network Analysis)
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Introduction

This paper attempts to explain political decision-making structures. A decision-making
structure represents the specific patterns of relations between collective actors which are
collaborating, fighting and struggling for influence in a policy network. It is defined by
mainly two dimensions, which are power and conflict (see Laumann and Pappi 1976, Kriesi
1980, Waarden 1992, Sciarini 1994, Knoke et al. 1996, Kriesi et al. 2006a). Decision-making
structures are important because of their influence on the output of the decision-making
processes (e.g. Knoke 1990, Sciarini 1994, 1996, Daugbjerg and Marsh 1998, Marsh and
Smith 2000, Fischer et al. 2003). However, there is an important question that logically
precedes the question on the relationship between the decision-making structure and the
output. One has to detect why a given decision-making structure forms (Jönsson et al. 1998:
332, König and Bräuninger 1998: 446, Linder 2005: 117). Thus, this paper raises the
following question: How can one explain political decision-making structures?
To answer this question, the present paper compares the 11 most important decision-making
processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. By doing so, it attempts to establish the
factors that are responsible for a specific decision-making structure to form. The factors that
are expected to influence the decision-making structure are Europeanization, media presence,
the pre-parliamentary phase, federalism and the referendum. There exist several studies
analyzing the influence of one of these factors on decision-making structures (or a dimension
of it). However, given the increasing complexity of political systems (Hall 2003, Schmitter
2009), it is very implausible that one factor alone can fully explain decision-making
structures. For instance, the literature on Europeanization (siehe Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002:
255f., Börzel and Risse 2003: 60, Radaelli 2003: 27, Schmidt 2006: 671, Haverland 2007) or
on federalism (Braun 2000: 5, 11) ask no longer whether, but how, and under which
circumstances these factors influence decision-making structures. Therefore, this study
considers the joint impact of different factors and their possible interactions. Moreover, while
the literature traditionally tended to attribute a specific decision-making structure to a whole
country, it is now acknowledged that differences between policy domains are more relevant
and that no single pattern of decision-making structure exists within one country. Therefore,
the present analysis concentrates on the level of policy domains within one country (Laumann
and Knoke 1987, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, Waarden 1992, Knoke et al. 1996, Kriesi et al.
2006a). Besides simply highlighting the important differences between policy domains, this
sectoral approach also makes use of this variance in order to identify the factors that affect
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decision-making structures. A first objective of the paper is thus to detect the causal paths that
lead to different decision-making structures.
The second aim is methodological, as the paper is supposed to demonstrate the utility of
applying a sequential mixed methods design. Concretely, the study combines Social Network
Analysis (SNA, Wasserman and Faust 1994, Carrington et al. 2005) and QualitativeComparative Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). Social Network Analysis – as a tool
to precisely describe cases – and QCA – as a tool to systematically compare them – combine
very well for the analysis of complex phenomena such as decision-making structures
(Spreitzer and Yamasaki 2008). On the one hand, my analysis will show that tools of SNA are
very valuable for the process of calibration of the different dimensions of decision-making
structures. On the other hand, it provides a demonstration of the fruitful combination of SNA
and QCA. Note however that QCA emphasizes the dialogue between theoretical ideas and
empirical evidence (Ragin 1987, 2000) and that this paper is but a first step of this dialogue.
Therefore, the results of the comparative analysis in the second part of the paper are to be
taken with caution as they do not constitute ―final‖, robust findings, but more intermediate
results to be worked on.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter two discusses the link of policy networks and
decision-making structures and introduces the two main constitutive dimensions of decisionmaking structures. The different factors that are expected to influence the decision-making
structure are presented in chapter three. Chapter four presents the methods, the data and the
calibration of the outcome and the conditions. Results are presented in chapter five, chapter
six concludes.

2

Policy networks and decision-making structures

By their multiple relations, collective actors that are part of a political system – such as state
actors, political parties, interest groups or regional actors – form a policy network. Such
policy networks can be observed at the level of the whole political system (e.g. Kriesi 1994,
Kriesi 2007) or at the level of single policy domains (e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Atkinson and
Coleman 1989, Schneider 1992, Sciarini 1994, Knoke et al. 1996). In the context of this
paper, a policy network is defined as a general and neutral term expressing the fact that
different actors are connected by different kinds of relations (Waarden 1992, Kriesi 1994,
Sciarini 1995, 1996, Kriesi et al. 2006a, Kriesi 2007).2 The structure that the policy network
2

Note however that there exists certain confusion in the literature on the definition of a policy network. First, the
concept is used as a metaphor for any type of relations between actors in a policy domain, but it is not backed by
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assumes is specified by the decision-making structure. This specific structure has an influence
on the output of the process (siehe z.B. Atkinson and Coleman 1989: 50ff., Kriesi 1994: 21,
Kriesi and Jegen 2001: 251, Marsh and Smith 2001: 536, Christopoulos 2008: 476).3 Note
however that decision-making structures are quite general descriptions and that phenomena on
a more micro-level, such as strategic interactions between single actors, are not caught on this
level of abstraction. A decision-making structure should therefore be conceived of as a
general map of the decision-making process, which delivers an overview of the structural
positions of the different actors (Dowding 1995: 157).4
Decision-making structures contain two constitutive dimensions, which are power and
conflict. These are two of the most basic and important concepts of political science. As
Heclo (1974: 304) states:
„Tradition teaches that politics is about conflict and power.―
These two dimensions are strongly linked and condition each other. On the one hand,
knowing which actors are powerful without being aware of their positions is of little use. On
the other hand, identifying the different positions is not very interesting without looking at
which actor is able to enforce its positions. Given this close connection, power and conflict
are often jointly analyzed in the literature (e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976, Sabatier 1987,
Knoke et al. 1996, Fischer et al. 2003, Sciarini et al. 2004, Kriesi et al. 2006a). In what
follows, I describe the two dimensions of decision-making structures.

2.1 Power
Max Weber defines power as
„…any chance to achieve its own will in a social relationship even against resistance.‖
(Weber 1980, cited in Weiss 1996: 306).

any empirical observations. This lack of empirical basis makes it difficult to use a policy network as a part of a
causal model to be tested empirically (Dowding 1995, 2001, Christopoulos 2008). Second, the concept is also
used not as a neutral term, but as a new and qualitatively different form of policy making, situated between the
state and the market. This again is problematic because the promising concept can then only be applied to a very
restricted number of situations.
3
Marsh und Smith (2000: 9) rightly emphasize that this relation between decision-making structures and the
output of the decision-making process is not unidirectional, but that the output also influences the decisionmaking structures due to a feedback-mechanisms. However, this „dialectial model― is too complicated and
therefore of little use for analytic and empirical applications (Dowding 2001: 102).
4
Note that this conception also implies that temporal development of a decision-making process is neglected.
The different phases of the process are analyzed together, therefore decision-making structures as reconstructed
in this paper represent a simplified, synthetic and map of the decision-making process.
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The question of who possesses power is one of the most basic questions in political science
(see e.g. Dahl 1961). The objective is to find out which actor is able to impose its policy
objectives and thereby to influence political decision-making (e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976,
Waarden 1992, Kriesi 1994, Knoke et al. 1996, Sciarini et al. 2004). This can be conceived of
as a hierarchy, with the most powerful actor at the top and the other actors occupying the
ranges according to their relative power. Two elements define the form of such a power
hierarchy. On the one hand, one has to define which actor or type of actor is most powerful.
On the other hand, power can be concentrated in the hands of just a few actors or it can be
shared among several actors.
Concerning the first aspect, the dominant actor, the most important distinction is whether state
actors or non-state actors dominate the decision-making process. This distinction is guided by
the logic of the function of the actors in the political system. While representatives of the
central state are official decision-makers presumed to defend the general interest, non-state
actors try to get as much access as possible to the decision-making process and to influence
the output according to their interests. The comparison of the central state‘s power compared
to its societal and political environment serves to evaluate to which degree the state is
autonomous in its decisions (see e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Skocpol 1985, Atkinson and Coleman
1989, Schmidt 2006). The category of state actors contains representatives of the federal
government and the federal administration. Non-state actors include political parties, interest
groups, and the cantons.
The second aspect emphasizes the form of the power hierarchy between the actors. The
question is to which degree power is distributed among the actors. The most influent actor can
be very dominating in the sense that he is the only one that really influences the decisionmaking process, while the rest of the actors play only minor roles. Alternatively, power can be
largely distributed among several actors and no one clearly dominates the structure. In this
case, no single actor can impose its preferences, but a high number of actors can potentially
influence the decision (see e.g. Katzenstein 1978, Atkinson and Coleman 1989, Kriesi et al.
2006a).

5

2.2 Conflict

Like power, conflict is one of the most basic and classic concepts of political science.5 In a
modern political system, where a lot of different actors with different interests interact,
conflict is unavoidable (Laumann and Pappi 1976: 26). It is
„…an endemic, necessary feature of any decision-making apparatus, which poses the
fundamental functional problem of establishing binding priorities among competing
goals.― (Laumann and Pappi 1976: 26).
Conflict is thus an important dimension of decision-making structures between political actors
(e.g. Laumann and Pappi 1976, Knoke 1990, Schneider 1992, Knoke 1993, Kriesi et al.
2006a).6 It has two important characteristics. On the one hand, it is important to assess the
substance of the conflict, thus the nature of the conflict line. On the other hand, conflict can
be strong or weak.
The conflict line is defined by assessing which actors oppose each other. The substance of the
conflict is inferred from the information on the opposing actors. Nowadays, two conflict lines
are relevant in politics (Kriesi 1998, Kriesi et al. 2006b, 2008).7 First, an old and important
conflict line exists between the market and the state, where the traditional right opposes the
traditional left. While the right and bourgeois parties as well as employers‘ associations and
interest groups of the economy defend free markets, left parties and unions defend more state
intervention. Second, there exists a newer, but lately very important conflict between
defenders of openness of a country and defenders of its traditions. In this case, the
nationalistic SVP and representatives of the domestic economy oppose the center-right
parties, the representatives of the export economy as well as the political left.
The second aspect, the intensity of the conflict, gives an idea on how much the opposing
positions differ from each other. There is reason to believe that conflict is more intense if
fundamentally different values and ideologies oppose each other. If the disagreement is only
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Already in the early 20th century, Carl Schmitt defines politics as the differentiation between friends and
enemies (see e.g. Rieger 1995).
6
Note that studies about conflict in Swiss politics are quite rare, which might be due to the fact that Switzerland
is often seen as being the consensus democracy par excellence, where institutions and the political culture foster
consensus building (Neidhart 1970, Kriesi 1980, Lijphart 1999). For instance, it is not yet clear how exactly the
degree of Europeanization or the intensity of the pre-parliamentary phase influence the level of conflict
(Neidhart 1970, Sciarini et al. 2002, Nicolet et al. 2003, Sciarini 2006).
7
Originally, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify 4 main conflict lines (cleavages) between capital and work, land
and urban interests, state and church, and center and periphery. It is argued that the classic cleavages lose
salience or adapt because of economic and cultural developments.

.
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about technical details, conflict is supposed to be less intense (see the three levels of opinions
in Sabatier 1987, 2006).

3

Factors affecting the conflict structure

In order to find an explanation for the different decision-making structures, I take into account
five factors. As mentioned in the introduction, I expect these factors to jointly influence the
decision-making structure. However, given the more explorative nature of this analysis and
the high number of possible interactions, I will not formulate hypotheses about the joint
impact of these factors on the decision-making structures. In order to nevertheless guide the
lecturer, expectations about their independent influence are formulated at the end of the
presentation of each factor. I take into account factors already included in earlier studies
(Sciarini et al. 2002, Nicolet et al. 2003, Sciarini 2006), namely the intensity of the preparliamentary phase and the degree of Europeanization. Additionally, I introduce three other
factors, which are media presence, federalism and the referendum.8

3.1 Europeanization
The influence of the European Union even on non-memberstates like Switzerland is well
assessed in the literature (Mach et al. 2003, Sciarini et al. 2004, Fischer 2005).
Europeanization describes the phenomenon that more and more formerly domestic decisionmaking processes are influenced by the European environment. Not only is the substance of
public policies affected, but also the institutions of the decision-making process and the
relations among political actors is influenced (Sciarini et al. 2004). First, because of the
existence of international negotiations, state actors are expected to dominate Europeanized
processes. Second, such processes tend to be closed, which makes that power is rather
concentrated in the hand of very few actors. Third, Europeanization has an influence on the
conflict line. It has been shown that in Europeanized cases the classical left-right division
loses its importance and the main conflict takes place between defenders of the opening of the
country towards the outside and defenders of traditions and international independence
(Brunner and Sciarini 2002, Kriesi et al. 2006b, 2008). Fourth and finally, the degree of
Europeanization of a policy domain is expected to have an influence on the conflict level. In
8

I am aware of the fact that some of these factors – mainly the existence of a referendum and media presence –
can also be seen as being a consequence more than a cause of a given decision-making structure. However,
remember that the decision-making structure describes an overall, synthetic picture of the process from its
beginning until the end. In this sense, all of the factors can be conceived of as causes for a given decisionmaking structure.
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this respect, two opposing theoretical arguments exist. On the one hand, problems concerning
the opening and international exposition of the country may push internal actors to close their
ranks (see Katzenstein 1984, 1985). In this case, conflict is expected to be lower. On the other
hand however, the fact that Europeanized acts have a strong ―take-it-or-leave-it‖ character
reduces the room for maneuver of internal actors such as political parties and interest groups
(Moravcsik 1994).

3.2 Media presence
With the mediatization of politics, politics adapted a media logic and political actors have
become more dependent on media and communication (Blumler and Kavanagh 1996,
Wolfsfeld 1997, Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999). Besides the work and lobbying in the
institutional arenas, the mobilization of the public opinion has become an important influence
strategy for political actors. In this new context, political actors compete for media attention
in order to attract public support for their policy plans, and thereby pressure policy-makers
and influence political outputs (Danielian and Page 1994, Wolfsfeld 1997, Tresch 2008). Also
political actors in Switzerland ―struggle for media attention― (Wolfsfeld 1997), as statements
in the television or the Sunday press are said to have more important consequences than direct
lobbying in the parliament ( Häusermann et al. 2004, Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Especially
actors with little influence in the decision-making process can try to mobilize public attention
and thereby expand the conflict (Schattschneider 1960). Strong media presence has the
following consequences on the decision-making structure. First, mainly external actors are
supposed to attempt to mobilize the public opinion by being present in the media. Therefore,
external actors are expected to dominate the process. Second, due to the same reason, power
tends to be largely distributed. Third, following the argument of conflict expansion, I expect
highly mediatized acts to display higher conflict levels. The conflict line is not affected by
this factor.

3.3 The referendum
In Switzerland, after an act has passed the usual legislative process, it can still be defeated in a
popular referendum.9 If it takes place, this last phase of the decision-making process is crucial
as it can invalid a policy project as a whole. That is why the threat of launching an optional
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There exist two kinds of referendums. One is mandatory and takes place in the case of an amendment of the
constitution or of certain international treaties. The other kind of referendum is optional. 50‗000 citizens or 8
cantons can request a popular vote on every federal law or decree after it was voted in parliament.
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referendum is a strategic influence option for political actors whose interests were not taken
into account during the decision-making process. But even when the referendum is
mandatory, decision-makers must open up the decision-making process in order to include a
broad range of societal interests and thereby avoid a defeat in the popular vote. In any case,
political actors have to fight hard for their positions in a referendum campaign, as they lose
control over the destiny of the project (Sciarini and Trechsel 1996, Linder 2005: 251).
Therefore, whenever a referendum takes place, it influences the decision-making structure.
First, the opening up of the process has the consequence that external actors dominate over
state actors. Second, the same mechanisms leads to a large distribution of power. Third, the
conflict level is high in the case of a referendum vote. The referendum has no influence on the
conflict line.

3.4 The pre-parliamentary phase
The pre-parliamentary phase is commonly seen as the key phase in decision-making processes
in Swiss politics, mainly for two reasons (e.g. Kriesi 1980).10 First, the pre-parliamentary
phase has an important status in Swiss politics, as the possibility of a referendum makes that a
broad range of actors must be included in order to elaborate a consensual solution from the
very beginning on (Neidhart 1970). The pre-parliamentary phase offers a certain number of
access points which allow non-state actors to express their view and to influence the project
accordingly.11 Second, and partly because of the first reason, the pre-parliamentary phase is
considered important because the most important decisions concerning the substance and
form of the act are usually taken at this early stage of the decision-making process. The
openness of the pre-parliamentary phase, that is the opportunity for external actors to access
the decision-making arenas, is supposed to influence the decision-making structure.
Concerning the power dimension, an open pre-parliamentary phase leads to first, a large
distribution of power and second, a dominance of external over state actors. Further, an open
pre-parliamentary phase should lower the conflict level among the actors involved in the
decision-making process. 12 The first aspect of the conflict dimension, the dominant conflict
line, is not affected by this factor.
10

As stated by Sciarini (2006: 498), the importance of this phase heavily contrasts with the lack of scientific
knowledge about it. The studies of Kriesi (1980), Germann et al. (1985) or Poitry (1989) are outdated, the only
recent empiric work on the pre-parliamentary is by Sciarini et al. (2002).
11
According to Neidhart‘s (1970) reasoning, the intense pre-parliamentary phase with several access points for
non-state actors is designed to avoid a referendum.
12
However, note that Sciarini et al. (2002) find no clear results concerning the influence of the intensity of the
pre-parliamentary phase on the level of conflict in the following stages of the process.
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3.5 Federalism
In federalist states decision-making and implementation competences are shared between the
central and the regional level. Compared to other federal states, Swiss cantons even enjoy
particularly large competences (Braun 2003, Vatter 2006). Lately, one observes a certain
centralization of decision-making competences in Switzerland, but due to its relatively poor
resources the federal administration stays dependent on the cantons for implementation.
Therefore, different competences overlap between the federal and the cantonal level and
cantons are still powerful players in Swiss politics (Germann 2002, Braun 2003, Sciarini
2005, Sciarini and Bochsler 2006). However, the competence distribution varies between
different policy domains and so does the influence of the cantons. In domains where cantons
have important interests because their competences are directly concerned, societal interests
tend to be eclipsed. But even if societal actors are less important, the importance of the
cantons implies that external actors are dominant over state actors. It is argued that in
federalist decision-making processes, the central state does not have to negotiate with two
conflicting sides, but can concentrate on finding a constructive solution with only the cantons
(see e.g. Thomas 2001: 16f., Linder 2005: 117). Power is therefore expected to be
concentrated in the hands of a small number of actors. Additionally, the argument above
supports that conflict is low. Federalism does not influence the nature of the conflict line.

4

Methods and data

4.1 Social Network Analysis, Qualitative Comparative Analysis and their combination
The present analysis integrates Social Network Analysis (SNA, Wasserman and Faust 1994,
Carrington et al. 2005) and Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000,
2008) in a so-called sequential design (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 18, Morse 2003). The
two methods have, with very few exceptions (Stevenson and Greenberg 2000, Spreitzer and
Yamasaki 2008, Magetti 2009), never been combined before. However, as this application
will show, they are highly compatible. In a first step, tools of SNA are used to characterize the
different decision-making structures. SNA serves well for this purpose, being an approach
that focuses on the analysis of links (power and conflict relations) between nodes (collective
actors). Thus, it is able to describe the specific decision-making structure in the different
networks. While the description of decision-making structures is without a doubt of great
value for the understanding of specific decision-making processes, it cannot by itself explain
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the formation of decision-making structures. 13 This is why in a second step, a causal element
is added to the research design by comparing the 11 cases in a Qualitative-Comparative
Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). This allows detecting the multiple configurations
of causes leading to a specific decision-making structure. QCA serves especially well to
analyze phenomena which are supposed to be the result of multiple conjunctural causation,
where different combinations of conditions can lead to the same outcome. For the present
analysis, I rely on fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), in which the different conditions and the outcome
to be explained can take continuous values to account for different degrees of presence of a
phenomenon. 14 QCA being mainly a case-based method, the definition of these values, called
calibration, is based on the thick description of the cases. Such a calibration procedure should
always be based on multiple indicators in order to have a complete view on the case and to
check for consistency of the results (Goertz 2006, Schneider and Wagemann 2007). In the
present analysis, the description is made with SNA-based indicators as well as with other
empirical information out of documentary sources. As indicated above, decision-making
structures are composed of the two main dimensions conflict and power, each containing two
aspects. There are thus four outcomes to explain, which requires four separate fsQCA.

4.2 Data
This paper compares the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland
between 2001 and 2006.15 The cases are the 11th pension reform, the program of budget relief
2003, the extension of the bilateral agreement on the free movement of persons and flanking
measures, the bilateral agreement on the taxation of savings, the bilateral agreement on
Schengen/Dublin, the law on nuclear energy, the law on the infrastructure fund, the new law
on foreigners, the reform of fiscal equalization and tasks distribution, the new constitutional
articles on education and the law on telecommunication.
Data on these cases was gathered through approximately 250 semi-structured interviews with
representatives of organizations involved in the 11 decision-making processes under study.
Based on positional, decisional, and reputational approaches (see e.g. Knoke 1993: 30), 20 to
30 organizational actors per process were identified and interviewed. Most of the interviews
13

In fact, SNA is has often be criticized to be merely descriptive (see e.g. Dowding 1995).
Note that the original, crisp-set QCA mechanism requires the dichotomization of the conditions and the
outcome, which of course leads to quite crude measures. See Rihoux and Ragin (2008: 119) for a more extended
discussion of the advantages of fsQCA over other forms of QCA.
15
This according to an exhaustive expert survey for all processes that passed a parliamentary vote between
December 2001 and December 2006. Data were gathered for the research project ―The Swiss decision-making
system in the 21th century: power, institutions, conflicts (Sciarini and Serdült 2006).
14
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were conducted between February and July 2008. In line with the dominant conception
(Laumann and Knoke 1987, Knoke et al. 1996: 7), the study focuses on organizations and the
individual interview partners were asked to respond in the name of their organization.
Additionally, the study of official documents16 on the cases provide me with supplementary
information.

4.3 Fuzzy-set calibration
In what follows, I present the different indicators that were used for the calibration of the
conditions and the outcomes of each case. Ideally, the calibration procedure relies on previous
thick case descriptions. Due to the lack of space for such an endeavor, the raw data, that is the
values of the different indicators for each case are presented in appendix 1. These indicators
help to assess to which degree a case is a member of a given set. If a case is fully in a set, it
has a fuzzy score of 1, if a case is fully out of it, a score of 0 is attributed. Intermediate scores
like 0.8 (0.2) mean that a case is not fully, but mainly in (out of) the set, scores like 0.6 (0.4)
mean that a case is more or less in (out of) the set. Table 1 below summarizes the codes
accorded to the different cases.

4.3.1 Calibration of the outcomes
The first aspect of the power dimension, the dominant actor (DA), is covered by the
membership of a case in the set of decision-making structures totally dominated by state
actors. The negation of this set is a set of decision-making structures totally dominated by
external, non-state actors. Indicators are based on the reputation scores for the different actors.
These were gathered by asking interview partners to mention, from a list comprising all actors
participating in the process, the actors they considererd to be first, very influent, and second,
among the three most influent actors in the given decision-making structure. From this, I
calculated on the one hand the share of actors belonging to a specific actor type (state actors,
political parties, interest groups, cantons) compared to the total number of actors with a
minimum reputation score of 50% (corresponding to the actors in the "core", see Kriesi 1980)
respectively 75%. 17 On the other hand, I defined the dominant actor type according to the
average and the part-of-the-sum18 of the actor types‘ reputation score. These indicators were
16

Mainly the governments dispatch to the parliament (―Botschaft / message‖).
Only based on the results from the ―very influent actors‖- question.
18
The part-of-the-sum measure was calculated in the following way: First, I summed up the reputation values of
all single actors to a total reputation value of the process. On this basis I calculated the share of this "overall
influence" for each group of actors.
17
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calculated twice, once for the ―very influent actors‖- question and once for the ―three most
influent actors‖-question.
The second aspect, the distribution of power (PD), is defined by the membership scores of a
case in the set of decision-making structures where power is largely distributed. The negation
of this set is a set of decision-making structures with a concentration of power in the hands of
one actor. Indicators for the attribution of membership scores are on the one hand the absolute
number of actors in the core (gt 50%), the absolute number of actors with more that 75% of
reputation and the absolute number of actors mentioned as one of the three most important
ones. On the other hand, I calculated measures of kurtosis and skewness of the distribution of
reputational scores among all the actors participating in the process.19 These measures
indicate how much the distribution of reputation scores deviates from a normal distribution,
that is how flat the distribution is and towards which side it tends.
The first aspect of the conflict dimension, the dominant conflict line (CLI), gets covered by
the membership of a case in the set of decision-making structures with a perfect left-right
conflict line. The negation of this set is a set with a perfect openness-traditions conflict line.
The conflict line is measured by data on the convergence and divergence of actors‘ positions
in the process. Interview partners were asked to mention the actors with whom they had
diverging (coded as -1) or converging (coded as 1) views on the policy project in question,
this based on a list comprising all actors participating in that process. The resulting data
matrix was then analyzed with two different approaches to blockmodelling, a direct and an
indirect one. With the indirect method, the program (UCINET, Borgatti et al. 2002) first
calculates similarities of positions in the convergence/divergence profile of the actors and
then clusters them, beginning with the most similar ones and ending up with two blocks of
actors who‘s profiles are the most different from each other. With the direct method, the socalled ―generalized blockmodelling‖, the program (PAJEK, Batagelj and Mrvar 1996) directly
rearranges the data matrix in order to find a solution that best fits the ideal structure of two
opposing blocks (Doreian et al. 2005, Nooy et al. 2005). Both procedures identify the two
groups of actors that most strongly oppose each other. The substantial content of the conflict
line must then be interpreted from the actors that are part of the two opposing blocks.
Additionally, to check for robustness of the results and to exclude non-important actors, both
blockmodelling procedures were also performed on restricted networks containing only the
core actors (gt 50% of reputation).
19

These measures were calculated for the ―very influent actor‖-scale as well as for the ―three most influent
actors‖-scale.
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Finally, the second aspect of conflict is the conflict level (CLE). It‘s score is defined by the
membership of the cases in the set of decision-making structures with a very high conflict
level. The negation of this set is a set with very low conflict. Indicators of conflict are the
following: On the one hand, I calculated the average of convergent (1) and divergent (-1)
relations in the network. On the other hand, I calculated the average of the relations between
the two opposing blocks identified before.20 Both indicators were calculated based on the
whole network as well as on the restricted network containing only the core actors.

Table 1: Fuzzy values for conditions and outcomes
CASE

E

M

R

P

F

PD

DA

CLE

CLI

Pension
Budget
Savings
Persons
Schengen
Nuclear
Infrastructure
Foreigners
Telecom
Education
Fiscal equal.

0
0
0.8
0.6
0.8
0.2
0
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.2

0.8
0.2
0.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.4

1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1

0.4
0.8
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.8
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.8
1

0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.2
0
1
1

1
0
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.6
0

0.2
0.8
0.8
0.2
1
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.2
0
0.6

1
0.6
0.2
0.6
0.6
1
0.2
0.6
0.6
0
0.6

1
0.8
0.2
0.2
0
1
0.6
1
0.8
0.8

4.3.2 Calibration of the conditions
The different criteria used for the calibration of the five conditions are the following. First, the
degree of Europeanization (E) is defined by the case‘s membership in the set of fully
Europeanized cases. The negated set is the one of fully domestic cases. Specific case
knowledge is used to calibrate the cases. Second, the degree of media presence (M) is defined
by the membership in the set of cases that are strongly present in the media, while the
negation of this set is a set of cases not at all exposed to the media. This is measured with a
proxy. From the interview data, I dispose of information about the intensity of the activities of
the interviewed actors towards the media (press conferences, interviews, etc.) and about the
importance of the public debate compared to the negotiations and lobbying in the decisionmaking institutions. Using this data, I assume that cases where actors were actively looking
20

Note that this score was calculated based on the results only from the indirect blockmodelling procedure.
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for media attention were actually more present in the media than acts where this was less the
case. Third, the degree of federalism (F) is defined by the membership score in the set of fully
federalist cases. Its negation is the set of fully non-federalist cases. Case knowledge out of
documentary sources provides me with information on the intensity to which cantons
competences are touched by the policy project. Fourth, the referendum condition (R) is simply
coded 1 if a referendum took place and 0 if not. Fifth and finally, the openness of the preparliamentary phase (P) is covered by the case‘s membership in the set of cases with a very
open pre-parliamentary phase. The negation is a set of cases with a very closed preparliamentary phase. Two indicators are taken into account. The first is the absolute number
of access points for external, non-state actors. The second is the ratio of the number of stages
that constitute access points over the total number of stages that the pre-parliamentary phase
of the decision-making process is composed of.

5

Analysis and results

5.1 Preliminary remarks
As mentioned in the introduction, the following QCA is but a first step in the process of
dialogue between theoretical ideas and empirical evidence (Ragin 1987, 2000). As such, the
results should be looked at with caution. The analysis must be further revised in order to be
able to derive statements about necessary and sufficient set-relations that are highly consistent
with the empirical evidence and cover a maximum of the instances of the outcome. It is
thereby especially important to resolve contradictory configurations that still exist in the
present data.21
The two aspects from each of the two dimensions of the decision-making structure will be
analyzed separately. For each of the four analyses, only the factors for which there exist
theoretical expectations are taken into account. The analyses were conducted with the
software fsQCA (Ragin et al. 2009)22. The presence of the phenomenon and its absence are
analyzed separately. Further, the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions must be
separated and the former should precede the latter (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, Rihoux
and Ragin 2008). Each result is accompagnied by scores of consistency and coverage, which
are measures for the strength of the empirical support for arguments specifying set-theoretic

21

Contradictory configurations are given when two cases display the same values of the different conditions in
the truth table, but do not agree on the outcome.
22
The analysis of sufficient conditions was conducted using the Truth Table Algorithm.
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connections (Ragin 2008: 44).23 The minimization procedure of the thruthtables produces
three solutions, a parsimonious one, a complex one and an intermediate one. For lack of
space, only the intermediate solutions will be presented and discussed in the paper. 24
In the present case, the analysis of necessary conditions reveals that for all of the 8 (four
aspects plus their negations) outcomes, the highest consistency value for a necessary
condition is 0.86 (Condition P for the outcome ~PD). Especially given the relatively small
number of cases, this value is too low to support the claim of necessity (see Schneider and
Wagemann 2007: 213, 231ff.). Therefore, no necessary condition exists for any of the
outcomes. Consequently, the following analyses only look for combinations of sufficient
conditions for the outcomes.25 The respective truth tables, showing which combinations are
considered as consistent with the claim that a subset relation exists, can be found in appendix
2.

5.2 Power
First, I look at the two aspects of power and try to detect the causal paths that lead to the
dominance of state or external actors and to a distribution or a concentration of power. The
analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome DA, that is the dominance of state actors
over external actors, results in the following solution: 26
DA → ~R~M~E + ~F~PME

(consistency = .88 / coverage = .56).

The term means that there exist two different combinations of conditions that are connected to
a decision-making structure dominated by state actors. A first one consists of a nonEuropeanized policy, weak media presence and no referendum. Cases with strong
membership in this combination are the program of budget relief or the infrastructure fund. A
second, quite different combination of conditions is one of a Europeanized policy with strong
23

Consistency indicates how closely a perfect subset relation is approximated. Like statistical significance, it
signals whether an empirical connection merits the close attention of the investigator. Coverage assesses the
degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome. Like statistical strength, it
indicates the empirical relevance or importance of a set-theoretic connection. (Ragin 2008: 45).
24
When minimizing the truth table, the program can make us of the logical remainders (combination of causes
with no empirical observation due to limited diversity) in different ways. The parsimonious solution permits the
incorporation of any logical remainder that contributes to the derivation of a logically simpler solution. The
complex solution doesn‘t include any logical remainder at all. The intermediate solution makes only use of the
so-called ―easy‖ logical remainders, that is the ones that do not go against existing theoretical or substantial
knowledge.
25
The threshold for consistency of sufficient conditions should at least be .75. However, any major gap between
the consistency scores closest to 1 and the others (still gt .75) can serve as a threshold (Schneider and Wagemann
2007).
26
Note that by convention, capital letters indicate the presence of a phenomenon. A capital letter preceded by a ~
indicates absence of a phenomenon. Two letters together represent a situation of logical ―and‖. A + represents
the logical ―or‖ and thus separates two different paths to the outcome.
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media presence, but a closed pre-parliamentary phase and a low level of federalism. A case
with strong membership in this combination of conditions is the bilateral agreement on
Schengen/Dublin. Note that the first solution is, from an empirical point of view, slightly
more important than the second one. Thus, depending on the conditions with which they
combine, both a Europeanized policy as well as a non-Europeanized policy can lead to state
actors‘ dominance. The same is true for media presence. The effect of the other conditions is
in the direction that was theoretically expected, but no condition alone is sufficient to cause a
decision-making structure dominated by state actors.
Even three different combinations of conditions lead to the opposite outcome ~DA, that is a
decision-making structure dominated by external actors. The solution term for this outcome
is:
~DA → R(M~E+PM+FP~E)

(consistency = .86 / coverage = .68).

The solution reveals that the condition of the referendum is crucial when one wants to explain
why external actors can play an important role in a decision-making structure. The existence
of a referendum is part of all of the three combinations that are sufficient for the outcome
~DA. This makes obviously sense, as the referendum is the most important institution in
Swiss politics for external actors to oppose a legislative project. However, note that first, this
does not mean that the referendum is necessary for external actors to dominate the decisionmaking structure. Second, the referendum alone is never sufficient for external actors to
dominate a decision-making structure, but that at least two more conditions must be met.
Three possibilities that combine with the referendum provoke the outcome ~DA. These are
first, media presence and the absence of Europeanization, second, media presence and an
open pre-parliamentary phase, and third, the absence of Europeanization, an open preparliamentary phase and a high level of federalism of the issue. All of these solutions are of
roughly the same empirical relevance. Cases that are strong members in the first combination
are the pension reform, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners‘ law. Examples for
the second possiblity are the law on nuclear energy, the new foreigners‘ law or the bilateral
treaty on the free movement of persons. A very federalist issue dominated by the cantons, the
constitutional article on education, represents the third path to a decision-making structure
dominated by external actors. Again, the solution revealed that all five conditions are
somehow connected to the outcome ~DA, and again, no single condition is enough to make
sure that external actors dominate a decision-making structure. As part of their respective
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combinations, the single factors however work the way they are supposed to based on
theoretical argumentation.
The second aspect of power was defined as the distribution of power among the actors in the
decision-making structure. The analysis of the thruth table reveals that there exists only one
combination of factors that can be regarded as sufficient for power to be largely distributed
among actors. This solution is expressed by the term
PD → ~FRM

(consistency = .94 / coverage = .59).

The path that leads to a decision-making structure where power is distributed among several
actors is conditioned by a non-federalist case with strong media presence and decided on in a
referendum vote. The pension reform, the free movement of persons, the Schengen
agreement, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners‘ law are strong members of this
combinations‘ set. This result suggests two things. First, it seems that the conditions of
Europeanization and of the pre-parliamentary phase are unimportant to explain why power in
a given decision-making structure is distributed among several actors. Second, the finding
reveals that there is only one specific causal path with three conditions for the outcome PD.
This fits with earlier findings on Swiss politics, stating that in general, power is not largely
distributed and a very small number of actors are able to really influence policy making in this
country (Kriesi 1980).
The term of sufficiency for the opposite situation, a decision-making structure where power is
concentrated in the hands of only very few actors, is the following:
~PD → ~R~M~E + ME

(consistency = .82 / coverage = .64).

Two different combinations of conditions are sufficient for a decision-making structure to be
dominated by one or only very few actors. Both parts of the solution term have roughly the
same empirical importance. The interesting thing is again, like in the causal chains leading to
the domination of state actors, that the absence and the presence of the same factors play a
role, depending on their specific combination. On the one hand, there are cases that are
domestic, not mediatized and not subject to a referendum. Cases with strong membership in
this combination of causes are the infrastructure fund and the program of budget relief. On the
other hand, concentration of power is connected to the presence of Europeanization and the
media. This is however a puzzling result as both cases with strong membership in this
combination of conditions, that is the free movement of persons and the Schengen agreement,
are not strong members in the set of cases with power concentration. This result needs to be
revised.
18

5.3 Conflict
The second dimension of decision-making structures is conflict. First, I look at what factors
are responsible for the nature of conflict, which is expressed by the dominant conflict line
between the actors. The degree of Europanization of the decision-making process is the only
condition for which theoretical expectations concerning the nature of the conflict line exist.
Consequently, I concentrate only on this factor.27 Analysis reveals that the absence of this
Europeanization is sufficient for a left-right conflict line to occur:
CLI → ~E

(consistency = .84 / coverage = .84).

This finding is of course very trivial. For the opposite outcome, that is the negation of the
outcome (~CLI) and thus the presence of an openness-traditions conflict line, no condition or
combination of conditions is sufficient. The empirical evidence is not consistent enough with
the claim that Europeanization is sufficient for the existence of an openness-traditions conflict
line. This result is caused by the case of the law on telecommunication. In fact, this is a case
of indirect Europeanization, but it provokes a left-right conflict line. Generally, the outcome
of the conflict line needs further examination. For instance, more factors need to be taken into
account in order to shed light on the question of the conditions connected with a specific
conflict line.
The second aspect of conflict is its intensity, the conflict level. The minimal term that
expresses the sufficient condition for high conflict is
CLE → ~FMR

(consistency = .94 / coverage = .53).

Non-federalist cases with high media presence and in which a referendum takes place display
high conflict levels. Instances with strong membership in this combination are the pension
reform, the Schengen agreement, the law on nuclear energy and the new foreigners‘ law. Note
that interestingly, this combination of conditions is exactly the same that was already
identified to be connected with the outcome of a large distribution of power. However, the
two phenomena do of course not always co-occur. While the term above only expresses
sufficiency, there can still be other, and different, combinations of conditions that lead to
either high conflict or distribution of power. Again, the fact that only one combination of
conditions is sufficient for high conflict fits with earlier findings and with the general idea that
in Swiss politics, high conflict is rather rare (see FN 5). At the same time, it seems that two
27

Note that the case of the new constitutional article on education was taken out of the cases analyzed
concerning their conflict line. In fact, this case does not display any conflict line that makes sense, given the fact
that all actors agreed on the final solution.
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factors for which there exist theoretical arguments about their influence on the level of
conflict, Europeanization and the pre-parliamentary phase, are not responsible for the
outcome CLE. That means that their absence is not automatically associated with high
conflict, contrary to what was expected by theory.
The last outcome for which a solution term containing sufficient conditions needs to be
presented is the negation of high conflict. This is the situation of a decision-making structure
with no or low conflict among the actors. This solution term is:
~CLE → ~M~R(E+PF)

(consistency = .91 / coverage = .40).

It suggests that two causal paths to low conflict exist. The two sufficient combinations share
two conditions, that is low media presence and no referendum. This finding underlines the
link between conflict and the referendum on the one hand and media presence on the other
hand. However, the absence of these factors is not sufficient to avoid conflict. More
conditions need to combine with low media presence and the absence of a referendum. The
two factors have to be combined either with a high degree of Europanization or with an open
pre-parliamentary phase and a federal policy. A case with strong membership in the first set is
the bilateral agreement on the taxation of savings. An example for the second combination is
the law on the infrastructure fund. Both of these possible combinations cover roughly the
same amount of the instances of the outcome. The finding again reveals the importance of
taking into account all the five conditions for the explanation of low conflict. All the effects
are in the suspected direction.

6

Conclusion

This paper describes, compares and attempts to explain the decision-making structures in 11
different decision-making processes in Switzerland that went through parliament between
2001 and 2006. Decision-making structures describe the specific form that a policy network
takes. They are important because of their consequences on the policy output of a process.
Decision-making structures consist of two dimensions, namely power and conflict. Five
factors, that is Europeanization, media presence, federalism, the referendum and the structure
of the pre-parliamentary phase, were taken into account for the explanation of two aspects of
each of the two dimensions of decision-making structures.
The first objective of the paper was the explanation of the decision-making structures by the
factors cited above. The main conclusions concerning this objective are the following: First,
there exists no single necessary condition for any of the aspects that were examined. This is a
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strong indicaton of equifinality, that is the existence of several causal paths leading to the
same outcome. Additionally, the analyses of sufficiency revealed that in most cases, more
than one combination of conditions is sufficient for an outcome. Second, all the results, except
the one for the conflict line, suggest that a combination of at least two conditions is needed in
order for it to be sufficient for the outcome. This reveals a phenomenon of conjunctural
causation, thus a situation where different factors interact and jointly produce the outcome.
Third, and more substantially, all the five factors played a role for the explanation of decisionmaking structures. However, remember that this QCA does not display final, corroborated
results, but is only a first step in the dialogue between theoretical ideas and empirical
evidence. Concerning the second, methodological objective, this paper shows clearly how
complementary SNA and QCA are and how useful such a combination can be. Social
Network Analysis, on the one hand, is a strong tool to precisely describe phenomena such as
decision-making structures, but it has no explanatory power per se. QCA, on the other hand,
depends on substantive case knowledge and thick description as a basis for the systematic
comparison of the cases.
Of course, the present version of the paper has a certain number of weaknesses and
limitations. First, it is clear that the QCA must be revised. Closer examination of the cases can
reveal details that influence the calibration. The inclusion of more theoretical factors may
allow to find more fine-grained and consistent explanations for the different outcomes. And
finally, the application of a two-step procedure is able to take into account the underlying
structure of the influence factors and thereby to reduce the number of logical remainders
(Schneider and Wagemann 2006, Schneider and Wagemann 2007: 256ff.). Second,
concerning the cases under study, this analysis is of course limited to the most important
decision-making processes. It can not automatically be claimed that the findings are valid for
the whole range of decision-making processes in Switzerland at the beginning of the 21th
century, or for other periods or other countries. This should be evaluated taking into account
the specificities of the political system. The present paper delivered some elements that allow
us to better understand the causal mechanisms between a decision-making structure and its
context.
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Appendix 1: Raw data used for the calibration of the outcome

a) Dominant actor (DA)
GT 50% (core)
CASE
Pension
Budget
Savings
Persons
Schengen
Nuclear
Infrastructure
Foreigners
Telecom
Education
Fiscal equal.

State Party
31
33
56
36
50
28
41
30
25
31
20

31
44
11
29
25
28
18
40
25
23
30

IG

Canton

Part-ofAverage Part-of- the-sum
Average 3 most
the-sum 3 most
influence influent influence influent

30
0
33
40
0
40
67
0
17
0
0

0
33
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
50
33

Party
State
IG
IG
Party
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
IG
IG
State
IG
Cantons
State
State
State
Cantons
State
IG
IG
State
State
State
State
Party
State
Party
State
Party
Party
IG
IG
Cantons Cantons Cantons Cantons
Other
State
State
State

GT 75%

IG

Canton

38
11
22
36
13
39
24
20
50
8
20

0
11
11
0
13
6
18
10
0
31
30

State Party
30
67
67
20
100
40
33
43
29
0
67

40
0
0
40
0
20
0
57
57
50
0

b) Power distribution (DP)

CASE
Pension
Budget
Savings
Persons
Schengen
Nuclear
Infrastructure
Foreigners
Telecom
Education
Fiscal equal.

N of actors N of actors N of actors
(reputation (reputation (3 most
gt 50%)
gt 75%)
influent)
13
9
9
14
16
18
17
10
16
13
10

10
3
3
5
3
5
3
7
7
6
3

22
16
22
22
27
26
25
20
19
21
15

Kurtosis
Kurtosis Skewness (3 most
(Influence) (Influence) influent)
-0.21
1.65
-0.51
-1.07
-1.32
-1.10
-1.05
0.12
-1.49
-0.98
0.11

1.11
1.60
0.64
0.71
0.41
0.61
-0.07
1.18
0.31
0.50
0.97

-0.85
0.06
2.98
0.89
1.10
2.95
10.63
1.71
5.94
8.55
-0.34

Skewness
(3 most
influent)
0.87
1.23
1.92
1.41
1.44
1.82
2.95
1.62
2.37
2.64
1.11
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c) Conflict lines (CLI)
Block-modeling (all)
CASE
Pension
Budget
Savings

Persons
Schengen
Nuclear
Infrastructure

Block 1

Block-modeling (core)
Block 2

Block 1

Block 2

SP,Grüne,SGB, Unia,
FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO,SAV,SGV,
Travail.Suisse
Alliance F
SVP,FDP,CVP, ECO,SAV, SGV SP,Grüne,SGB,Travail.Suisse
,VGB,transfair,SBV
SVP
FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SGV
,SBVg,Swissholdings,Travail.
Suisse
SVP
FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SAV
,SGV,SBV,SGB,Travail.Suisse

SP,SGB,Travail.Suisse

FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO,SAV,SGV

SP

FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO

SVP

FDP,CVP,SP,Grüne,ECO,SAV
,SGV,SGB,Travail.Suisse

SVP

SVP

FDP,SP,CVP,ECO

SP,Grüne

FDP,SVP,CVP,ECO

SP,Grüne,SGB

SP,CVP,FDP,Grüne,ECO,
Travail.Suisse
CVP,FDP,SVP,ECO,SGV

SBVg, Economiesuisse, FDP

SP,Grüne,CVP,SGB,VCS,
(TCS),(FDP)
SP,Grüne,SGB,Travail.Suisse SVP,FDP,CVP,SBV,SGV, SAV

SP,SGB

SVP,FDP,CVP,SAV

Telecom

SP,SGB,Swisscom,Gew.
Kommunikation,(SVP)

SP,Swisscom,Gew.
Kommunikation,(SVP)

FDP,CVP,ECO,ASUT,Sunrise,
(SVP)

Education

(SVP)

Foreigners

Fiscal equal.

SVP,(FDP),(TCS)

FDP,CVP,ECO,ASUT,Sunrise,
(SVP)

FDP,SP,CVP,Grüne,ECO,SGB,
(SVP)
SP,IGsozNFA,(Grüne),(SGB) CVP,FDP,SVP,ECO,(Grüne),
(SGB)

CVP,SP,FDP,TCS

FDP,SP,CVP,ECO
SP,IGsozNFA

CVP,FDP

This table reports only the most important parties and interest groups.
Divergent results between direct and indirect blockmodeling are indicated with brackets.

d) Conflict level (CLE)

CASE
Pension
Budget
Savings
Persons
Schengen
Nuclear
Infrastructure
Foreigners
Telecom
Education
Fiscal equal.

Average bw
Average all coalitions (all)
-0.04
0.01
0.23
0.11
0.11
-0.02
0.18
0.05
0.05
0.18
0.04

-0.33
-0.24
-0.11
-0.37
-0.53
-0.48
-0.03
-0.30
-0.25
0.41
-0.10

Average
core

Average bw
coalitions
(core)

-0.10
0.30
0.47
0.37
0.22
-0.09
0.21
0.13
0.08
0.34
-0.04

-0.55
-0.63
0.16
-0.85
-0.67
-0.69
0.01
-0.64
-0.35
0.41
-0.45
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Appendix 2: Truth tables

a) Outcome DA
CASE

E

M

R

P

F

DA

Consistency

Infrastructure
Budget
Schengen
Persons
Education,
Fiscal Equal.
Telecom,
Savings
Nuclear,
Foreigners
Pension

0
0
1
1

0
0
1
1

0
0
1
1

1
1
0
1

1
0
0
0

1
1
1
0

1.00
0.89
0.86
0.71

0

0

1

1

1

0

0.67

1

0

0

0

0

0

0.67

0
0

1
1

1
1

1
0

0
0

0
0

0.64
0.63

E

M

R

P

F

~DA

Consistency

0
0
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
0
1

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.91
0.88
0.86

0

0

1

1

1

1

0.83

1
0
1
0

0
0
1
0

0
0
1
0

0
1
0
1

0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0

0.67
0.60
0.57
0.56

CASE

E

M

R

P

F

PD

Consistency

Schengen
Nuclear,
Foreigners
Persons
Pension
Education,
Fiscal Equal.
Telecom,
Savings
Infrastructure
Budget

1

1

1

0

0

1

1.00

0
1
0

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
0

0
0
0

1
1
1

1.00
1.00
1.00

0

0

1

1

1

0

0.67

1
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
1
1

0
1
0

0
0
0

0.67
0.60
0.56

b) Outcome ~DA
CASE
Nuclear,
Foreigners
Pension
Persons
Education,
Fiscal Equal.
Telecom,
Savings
Infrastructure
Schengen
Budget

c) Outcome PD
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d) Outcome ~PD
CASE

E

M

R

P

F

~PD

Consistency

Infrastructure
Budget
Persons
Schengen
Education,
Fiscal Equal.
Telecom,
Savings
Nuclear,
Foreigners
Pension

0
0
1
1

0
0
1
1

0
0
1
1

1
1
1
0

1
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

1.00
0.89
0.86
0.86

0

0

1

1

1

0

0.75

1

0

0

0

0

0

0.67

0
0

1
1

1
1

1
0

0
0

0
0

0.64
0.63

E

CLI

Consistency

0

1

0.84

1

0

0.50

E

~CLI

Consistency

1

0

0.72

0

0

0.28

e) Outcome CLI
CASE
Pension, Nuclear,
Foreigners, Education, Fiscal
Equil., Infrastructure,
Budget
Persons, Schengen, Savings,
Telecom

f) Outcome ~CLI
CASE
Persons, Schengen, Savings,
Telecom
Pension, Nuclear,
Foreigners, Education, Fiscal
Equil., Infrastructure,
Budget
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g) Outcome CLE
CASE

E

M

R

P

F

CLE

Consistency

Persons
Schengen
Pension
Nuclear,
Foreigners
Budget
Telecom,
Savings
Education,
Fiscal Equal.
Infrastructure

1
1
0

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
1

1.00
1.00
1.00

0
0

1
0

1
0

1
1

0
0

1
0

1.00
0.78

1

0

0

0

0

0

0.67

0
0

0
0

1
0

1
1

1
1

0
0

0.67
0.60

CASE

E

M

R

P

F

~CLE

Consistency

Infrastructure
Telecom,
Savings
Budget
Schengen
Persons
Education,
Fiscal Equal.
Pension
Nuclear,
Foreigners

0

0

0

1

1

1

1.00

1
0
1
1

0
0
1
1

0
0
1
1

0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

0.83
0.78
0.71
0.71

0
0

0
1

1
1

1
0

1
0

0
0

0.67
0.50

0

1

1

1

0

0

0.45

h) Outcome ~CLE
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